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An 'Agriculture-based and Export-oriented'
Strategy
The authors of Accelerated Development in sub-
Saharan Africa: an Agenda for Action [World Bank
1981] describe the strategy they recommend as
'agriculture-based and export-oriented'. They are
critical of past trade and exchange rate policies which
'have overprotected industry, held back agriculture
and absorbed much administrative capacity' (p 4).
They particularly dislike direct controls over trade,
such as import bans and quotas, which 'have proved
extremely costly to apply, as they require many trained
people and an enlarged administrative apparatus.
Moreover, they have frequently been ineffective' (p5).
The authors of the Report characterise their strategy
as:
open-ended, a necessary beginning; It will help
generate the resources Africa needs to consolidate
its political and administrative forces, educate and
improve the health of its people, and find out what
will work and what will not. It will bring forth
human talent now neglected and uncover physical
resources not yet imagined. And it will open the
way to a future whose shape we cannot yet see (p 7).
The main means of increasing export orientation are
changes in trade and exchange rate policy. These
include: correction of overvalued exchange rates;
improved price incentives for exports, including an
increase in producer prices for primary commodity
exports; lower and more uniform tariff protection for
industry; reduced use of direct controls on imports.
They admit that there are alternatives to devaluation,
such as export subsidies or reduced export taxes, but
prefer devaluation (combined with tariff reduction or
relaxation of import restrictions) on the grounds that
it has less of an adverse effect on the government
budget, gives rise to a smaller administrative burden
and eases the adjustment process (p 30).
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The 'Fallacy of Composition' and Primary
Export Prospects
As far as agriculture and primary production are
concerned, the Report points out that the volume of
such exports has been nèarly stagnant or declining in
most sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) during the
1970s. Agricultural exports for the region were no
greater by the end of the 1970s that they had been in
the early 1960s (p46). The Report's strategy requires a
renewed rapid increase in the volume of primary
exports. The 'fallacy of composition' inherent in this
approach is examined in Stephany Griffith-Jones'
article. The Report's advice to increase the volume of
exports of primary products may well be sensible if
given to the government of a single small country, but
not when it covers the whole region. In many cases, the
proportion of world output accounted for by SSA
(shown in Table 1) is large enough, given elasticities of
demand, to mean that an increase in production would
result in a fall in income from this source.
For example, SSA produces 84 per cent of the world's
palm kernels, 69 per cent of cocoa, 56 per cent of sisal,
41 per cent of groundnut oil, 28 per cent of palm kernel
oil, 28 per cent of coffee, 27 per cent of groundnuts and
19 per cent of tea. The beverages, coffee, tea and
cocoa, which are among SSA's most important
foreign exchange earners, are rendered particularly
vulnerable by their low price and income elasticities of
demand. Unless the increase in African production is
part of an international quota agreement, it does not
in such cases make sense.'
The Report verges on the disingenuous on this point.
'The slow growth of world demand for many primary
commodities', it suggests, 'is not a valid argument [in
favour of not increasing output of such commodities]
'This mistaken extrapolation from possible country options to general
prescription is a most inappropriate one for the World Bank to make,
Of all bodies, it should be most concerned with the impact of com-
modity export growth rates on their prices and total earnings for SSA
as a region, indeed on all primary exports. However, in falling into this
elementary 'fallacy of compositionS the Accelerated Development
Report is in the tradition of 1950s Bank country studies which
routinely advised each country to raise its export volume rapidly
by diversifying into other countries' major exports in order to avoid
worsening terms of trade!
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Table I
Africa's share of world and developing country agricultural exports
Source: World Bank 1981:172
as long as Africa does not even maintain its market
share' (p61). Reference to market share per se is surely
irrelevant. What matters is the consequence, ceteris
paribus, of a given increase in SSA output. ¡fit made
African farmers worse off than would otherwise be the
case, it would be better to sacrifice market share to
preserve real export earnings. At the very least, as far
as agriculture and primary production are concerned,
the consequences of increasing export incentives on a
continent-wide basis have to be looked at extremely
carefully commodity by commodity.
Prospects for Manufactured Exports - the
Kenyan Case
What, then, of the prospects of increasing the export
orientation of industry? Scepticism about the
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selected agricultural exports of sub-Saharan countries as a percentage:
prospects of raising foreign exchange earnings from
primary production, purely as a matter of arithmetic,
puts an enormous burden on industry. For instance,
Table 9.2 (p 122) projects a growth rate in real export
earnings during the 1980s, given a 'substantial aid
increase' and 'policy reform', of 5.2 per cent a year. If
primary product export earnings are stagnant and if
fuel exports at the annual average of 3.7 per cent for all
developing countries (on the Report's 'high-case'
assumptions) this implies a need for manufactured
exports to grow at an annual average real rate of 28 per
cent! Even the World Bank team does not think that
this is possible but it does say:
there is no reason why some of the relatively more
advanced countries such as Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Mauritius and Zimbabwe, should not be able to
of exports of those products of all
developing countries
1961-63 1969-71 1977-79
of exports of those products of the
whole world
1 961-63 ¡969-71 1977-79
Beverages
cocoa 81 77 72 80 76 69
coffee 26 30 29 26 29 28
tea 10 17 24 9 14 19
Cereals
maize 8 4 4 3 1 1
wheat 1 1 -
rice 1 2 - 1
cereals n.e.s. 17 4 3 4
Oils and oilseeds
groundnut oil 61 70 50 54 58 41
groundnuts (shelled) 88 77 55 86 69 27
oilseed cake and meal 16 17 6 10 8 4
palm kernel oil 92 82 32 55 55 28
palm kernels 91 82 84 90 82 84
palm oil 57 17 5 55 16 4
sesame seed 73 78 43 69 75 42
Other
bananas 11 7 5 11 7 5
cotton 18 23 23 11 16 li
rubber 8 7 5 7 7 5
sisal 65 61 57 61 60 56
sugar 11 13 10 5 6 4
tobacco 22 15 18 12 8 10
increase the volume of manufactured exports by at
least 10 per cent per year (p 96).
Since Kenya is cited, let us look in more detail at the
prospects for its manufactured exports. As Table 2
shows, Kenya's performance over the past decade in
this respect has been nothing short of disastrous. The
annual rate of growth in earnings at current prices of
manufactured exports (including even slightly pro-
cessed products, but excluding fuel and lubricants
based entirely on imported crude oil) was only 5.8 per
cent between 1973 and 1980.
Since price inflation was over 14 per cent on average,
this implies a substantial fall in the volume of Kenya's
manufactured exports between 1973 and 1980, in spite
of vigorous promotional efforts.
Prospects in Neighbouring Markets
As can be seen, over half of Kenya's manufactured
exports now consists of processed fuel and lubricants
from the Mombasa oil refinery. Apart from these,
exporting of manufactures is mainly a matter of
disposing of surpluses of goods produced essentially
for the home market in neighbouring countries.
Continued expansion of such exports depends on
keeping Kenya's import substitution process one step
ahead of those in its neighbours.2 Even in ideal
conditions (as existed for Kenya in the East African
Community before it broke up to 1977) such a strategy
was not easy [see Porter 1974 for further discussion].
As Tanzania and Uganda set up their own
manufacturing facilities Kenyan exporters had to
2The mechanisms of a manufactured export sector led by surplus
output of domestic market oriented import substitution industries are
unlikely to be those of the export market centred industries believed to
characterise NlCs.
Table 2
Kenya's exports of manufactured goods 1973-80
switch products (for instance, from beer, soap, paint,
bicycle tyres, footwear and matches to batteries,
insulated wire, gramophone records and plastic
products). Prior to the Community's final collapse it
was becoming more and more difficult for Kenya to
rely on keeping one step ahead to sustain export
growth to these markets. The markets were growing
more slowly; Tanzania and - until 1971 - Uganda
were accelerating their own import substitution; and
the cost of Kenya's new products relative to imports
from elsewhere was increasing. A similar process
affected other neighbouring markets as growth slowed
and competition increased both from third countries
and from their own import substituting industries.
Since the disintegration of the Community and closure
of the Tanzanian border (which cut off land routes to
the markets of Zambia and Burundi as well as that of
Tanzania), the war and its aftermath in Uganda, and
poor relations with Somalia have hampered the
traditional policy of keeping one step ahead of import
substitution in neighbouring markets. Moreover,
Zimbabwe has emerged as a dangerous new
competitor in these markets (and in the Kenyan home
market). Kenyan manufacturers have big hopes of
reopening the border with Tanzania and of continued
revival in the Ugandan market. The former has,
however, been 'imminent' for years and is in any case
of limited importance while Tanzania's (and others)
foreign exchange crisis remains so acute. Although
Uganda has once again become Kenya's most
important market, it is unlikely to offer the bonanza
that some appear to expect.3 Markets for manufactured
3lndeed the strength of Kenyan manufactured exports to Uganda is
largely çaused by the collapse of the Ugandan industrial sector. While
economic recovery in Uganda would increase total demand for
manufactures it would also increase domestic production in precisely
those lines which form the bulk of Kenyan exports to Uganda.
1973
(K 000,000)
1977 1978 1979 1980
Processed food and beverages 15 26 19 25 30
Processed industrial supplies 28 37 36 41 41
Processed fuel and lubricants 22 83 69 77 161
Machinery and capital equipment 3 1 2 3
Transport equipment 4 1 2
Other consumer goods 14 15 15 16 19
Total 86 163 141 161 256
Total less fuel and lubricants 64 80 72 83 95
Source; Economic Surveys, Central Bureau of Statistics, Nairobi.
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goods have expanded in oil producing countries,
particularly in the Arab region. Infrequent, unreliable
and costly shipping schedules make it difficult for
Kenya to gain a foothold in these. This has happened
only in the case of cement, which is an 'early-stage'
product in the process of industrialisation, and has a
potentially volatile market.
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Prospects in More Distant Markets
As for more distant markets (which at present account
for only about a tenth of manufactured exports),
Porter's calculations [Porter 1974] implied that there
was little prospect of Kenya inserting itself into world
trade in manufactures purely on the basis of cheap
labour. The Report has reinforced and updated this
Africas' exports are concentrated in a narrow range of commodities with poor price and quantity growth
prospects. (Loading cocoa in Ghana)
conclusion and applied it to SSA as a whole. Although
the examples of newly industrialising countries (NICs)
such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South
Korea (or the idealised and possibly distorted version
of their experience presented in the Report) obviously
dazzle the authors, they do recognise that:
neither the past record nor newly uncovered special
advantages suggests that concentration on exports
of labour-intensive manufactures is a promising
strategy for most of Africa.. . Labour costs and
productivity plus high management costs place
Africa at a severe disadvantage compared with
Asia (p 94).
This means that the export effort has to be founded on
resource-based industries. In Kenya's case these
include, for example, fruit and vegetable canning,
furniture and wood products, textiles and clothing,
footwear, sugar, confectionery, cordage, soda ash and
wattle extract.
Various problems exist in the manufacture of these
products. First, markets are growing only slowly. The
World Development Report 1982 [World Bank 1982]
predicts slower growth in industrialised economies in
the 1 980s than in the 1970s. Such growth as is likely to
occur is expected to be relatively jobless, offering no
relief to existing massive industrial-economy un-
employment. This means not only that markets for
primary products are going to be growing even more
slowly than usual, but also that the protectionist mood
in industrialised countries is likely to be reinforced,
and competition in third markets for manufactured
goods to be increased. Secondly, the element of value
added in what the Report recognises as often only
'slightly processed resources' is low. Thirdly, some
kind of tie-in with a transnational corporation (TNC)
is usually a precondition of penetrating European or
American markets for these products. For example,
Kenya exports soda ash through Imperial Chemical
Industries and wattle extract through Lonrho. As
Langdon [1980] points out, the Ivory Coast's (short-
lived) success as an exporter of textiles to Europe was
due to its French TNC connections. The Kenyan
textile industry was unable to break into the European
textile market partly because of its lack of a
longstanding European TNC connection.4 The only
promising case for Kenya in this respect is food
processing.
With prospects in more distant markets so poor, the
only African economies likely to achieve growth in
manufactured exports are those able to establish a
'peripheral-centre' or 'Brazilian' role in relation to
'As neither Kenya nor the Ivory Coast is either self-sufficient in cotton
nor a producer of synthetic or artificial staple fibre, it may be
questioned whether these are actually resource based industries. If
not, they fall under the general doubts expressed about cheap labour
based manufactured export development.
neighbouring economies and to hold on to it. This is
what Kenya did in relation to the East African
Community in the 1950s, 1960s and early l970s.
Zimbabwe is attempting a similar approach in relation
to Central and Southern Africa today. Occasional
windfalls occur (in the Kenyan case a major example
was the combination of Ugandan de-industrialisation
and coffee boom in 1977-78), but in general this is a
difficult role to sustain. At a time of continental
recession and foreign-exchange crisis the situation
looks even less promising. It is likely to prove a near-
zero-sum game with very small winnings.
Timing and Extent of the Package for SSA are
Crucial
Even when looked at from the viewpoint of one of the
'relatively more advanced countries' such as Kenya,
the package advocated in the Report as regards
manufacturing could be seen as either sensible but
fairly ineffective or disastrous. This would depend on
its timing and its extent.
The Report points correctly to the inefficiency of
much of SSA's industry. It uses as an example a survey
which showed that the cost of Kenya-produced cans
alone was higher than the landed price of canned
vegetables from Asian competitors located in the
Arabian Gulf (p 27). In general, the prices of locally
manufactured products in Kenya range between twice
and eight times the border price of the imported
equivalent. Surveys in other African economies would
probably reveal a similar picture.
This can be taken in either of two ways. On the one
hand, it shows that local industry is currently both
inefficient and ineffective. On the other hand it shows
that it is extremely vulnerable to the sudden removal of
direct controls and a substantial lowering of tariffs
(even if accompanied by devaluation).5 Indeed most of
it would be wiped out. Some economists would face
this prospect with equanimity or see it as, in the
Report's words, a process of 'clearing out the
deadwood'. On the other hand, it can be taken to show
that long-term manufacturing development (including
exports) require present and medium-term protection.
There is a danger of ignoring the dynamic arguments
in favour of industrialisation. Singer's emphasis on the
indirect effects of manufacturing industries as
'growing points for increased technical knowledge,
urban education, and the dynamism and resilience
that goes with urban civilisation, as well as the direct
5The Bank team, on the basis of research done in other economies
(p30), seems over-optimistic about the impact of devaluation in SSA.
Within six months of the September 1981 15 per cent devaluation in
Kenya three quarters of its effect has been wiped out by increases in
the annual rate of inflation.
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Marshallian external economies' [Singer 1950] is still
valid. So is the emphasis of Chenery [1955] and
Scitovsky [1954] on the dynamic external economies
enjoyed by an industry as a result of cost reductions or
demand increases in other sectors. Such externalities
make it dangerous to proceed as if future factor
supplies were given, rather than the consequence of
current resource allocation, and to plan in terms of
static rather than dynamic comparative advantage.
Certainly there is a case that most direct controls on
imports (particularly the Kenyan version which hands
control of the controls over to monopolistic
companies) should be removed.6 The small size of the
market means, however, that tariffs on imported
goods which are produced locally will have to be high
initially, with a phased programme of reduction to
allow survival and growth of productivity overtime. It
is possible that the authors of the Report would agree
with this. 'Sooner or later most countries will also have
to increase manufactured exports to maintain
industrial growth, expand employment opportunities
and diversify exports' (p 95). Quite so. But in Africa it
has to be later rather than sooner.
The 28 per cent rate of increase in manufactured
exports implied by the arithmetic of the Bank's
strategy is totally unrealistic. Even the 10 per cent rate
of increase actually proposed for a handful of
6This is not inconsistent with accepting overall macro import limits.
These could be enforced by means other than product by product
licensing.
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countries is not feasible. In this important respect the
strategy has its sums wrong and needs to be
re-thought.
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